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CASE COMMENT

COPYRIGHT LAW: AUTHORIAL RIGHTS V.
PUBLISHER PRIVILEGES
Greenbergv. National GeographicSociety,
244 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2001)
Kymberly Pierce*
Appellant, Jerry Greenberg, worked as a freelance photographer for
appellee, the National Geographic Society.' Appellee is responsible for the
publication of the National GeographicMagazine (Magazine). 2 Appellant,
while working for appellee,3 took a photograph of a diver, which appeared in
the July 1990 issue of the Magazine. 4 Additionally, the photo was the subject
of an explicit agreement that all rights acquired by appellee would be returned
to appellant after sixty days from the date of publication of the photograph.5
Some years later,6 appellee took part in a collaborative project to create a
thirty disk CD-ROM library, 7 which encompassed every NationalGeographic
Magazine from 1988 to 1996.8 The Magazine pages and layouts placed on the
CD-ROMs were identical to how they had appeared in the original
publications.9 Additionally, appellee used photographs from the magazine
covers to create an opening photographic and musical montage, which ran at
the beginning of every CD-ROM in the library.'0 Appellant's picture of a diver
was one of ten photos used in Appellee's twenty-five second opening
montage."

*
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I. Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1269 (11 th Cir. 2001).
2. Id at 1268.
3. Id. at 1269.

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269.

7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. The montage in its entirety was twenty-five seconds long and used overlapping

images of the covers so that one cover would come up and then fade as another cover was coming
up, with only ten photographs being used for the entire montage. Id
II. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1269.
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Appellant brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Florida and alleged copyright infringement. 2 In rejecting appellant's
argument that appellee's use ofthe photograph within the CD-ROM was a new
use, the District Court found that the appellee's use of the photograph was
merely a revision of the collective work and was within appellee's privilege as
a publisher under 17 U.S.C.S. § 20 1(c).' 3 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the

12. Id. at 1270. See 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (2001). Section 501(a), entitled "Copyright
Infringement and Remedies" classifies an infringer under subsection (a)which states in relevant
part:
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as
provided by sections 106 though 118 or of the author as provided in section
106A(a), or who imports copies or phono records into the United States in
violation of section 602, is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as
the case may be. For purposes of this chapter (other than section 506), any
reference to copyright shall be deemed to include the rights conferred by section
106A(a).
Id. Another pertinent section for infringement actions is Section 106A(a) which states:
(a)Rights and Attribution and Integrity. - Subject to Section 107 and independent of the
exclusive rights provided in section 106, the author of a work of visual art
(1) shall have the right(A) to claim authorship of that work, and
(B) to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of visual art which
he or she did not create;
(2) shall have the right to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of the work of
visual art in the event of a distortion, mutilation, or other modification of the work which would
be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation; and
(3) subject to the limitations set forth in section 113(d), shall have the right
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that work
which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any intentional distortion,
mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that right, and
(B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any intentional or
grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right.
Id. § 106A(a).
13. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1268. See also 17 U.S.C. § 201 (1976). Relevant sections of 17
U.S.C. § 201 of the 1976 Copyright Act state as follows:
Section 201 Ownership of Copyright
(a) Initial Ownership - Copyright in a work protected under this title vests initially in the
author or authors of the work. The authors of ajoint work are co-owners of copyright in the work.
(b) Works Made for Hire - In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other
person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and,
unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
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Eleventh Circuit heard appellant's appeal, reversed, and HELD, that the
appellee' s use of the photograph infringed appellant's copyright since appellee
used the photograph in a new collective work and the use was thus outside the
scope of the § 201 (c) privileges afforded to appellee. 4
Traditionally, courts have sought to interpret the laws relating to copyright
in conjunction with the rights afforded under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the U.S. Constitution-'. In order to achieve harmony between copyright law and
the U.S. Constitution, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976,6 which
enlarged author's rights and was better suited to achieve the societal goals of
copyright protection. 7 However, the widespread growth of technology and a
pressing demand to mainstream traditional educational methods into the current
technological age has left courts grappling with how far a publisher can
modernize past issues before an infringement occurs."
The crux of both arguments lies within the last sentence of § 201(c),19
specifically, the three phrases which purport to give limited privileges .to
publishers of collective works.2" Initially, courts were unsure of how far to
extend the privileges,2 but ultimately settled on a view that kept the exception
from swallowing up the general rule of copyright law.22

(c) Contributions to Collective Works - Copyright in each separate contribution to
a collective work is distinct from copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially
in the author of the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have acquired only
the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as part of that particular collective.
work, any revision of that collective work, and any later collective work in the same series.
Id. Other pertinent definitions include: "collective work" is a work, such as a periodical issue,
anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and
independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole. 17 U.S.C. § 101. A
"compilation" is defined as a work formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting
materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting
work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. Id. The term "compilation" includes
collective works. Id.
14. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1268.

15. Id. at 1271. See also U.S. CONST. art. Vill, cl. 8.
16. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
17. Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
18. See id.
19. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2001).
20. Id.
21. Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1268 (1 Ith Cir. 2001); see also
Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1149-50.
22. Tasini v. NY Times Co., 206 F.3d 161, 168 (2nd Cir. 1999); see also Ryan, 23 F. Supp.
2d at 1150-51. The U.S. Supreme Court recently affirmed the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit decision in Tasini. NY Times Co. v. Tasini, 121 S. Ct. 2381 (2001). Although
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In Tasini v. New York Times,23 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit interpreted § 201(c) in the context of a publisher using an electronic
database, which gave users access to contributions within the publisher's
collective works. 24 The plaintiffs in Tasini brought suit against several
publishing companies, contending that the publishers' act of placing plaintiffs'
articles on an electronic database infringed plaintiffs' copyrights. 5 The
publishing companies asserted that they were protected by the reproduction and
distribution privileges that §201 (c) accorded collective work copyright owners,
and thus they were within their rights granted by that section
to revise their
26
collective works into the form of an electronic database.
The Tasini court held that under these facts the databases were not among
the collective works covered by § 201(c) because the databases did not
constitute a revision ofthe original collective work, the periodicals, in which the
plaintiffs' articles first appeared. 2 The Tasini court further articulated that
courts should construe the revision clause of § 201 (c) to mean that a revision
ofa collective work is permitted only in limited circumstances. 2 Forexample,
revision ofa collective work is permissible only when the collective copyright
owner revises the entire collective work for a later'issue, since the collective
copyright owner holds a copyright only in the work that the collective owner
contributed to personally and does not have any rights in the preexisting
material. 29 The Tasini court reasoned that it was imperative to construe §
201 (c) with the U.S. Constitution in mind so that exceptions did not overtake
the general rule of copyright law: that the author of a work is the owner of the
copyright for that work.3"

Greenberg was not decided based on the U.S. Supreme Court's ruling, the ruling from the high
court clearly supports the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of § 201 (c).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Tasini, 206 F.3d at 167-70.
Id. at 165-66.
Id. at 164-65.
Id. at 165.
Id. at 165-66.
Tasini, 206 F.3d at 166-67.
17 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002). Section 103(b) states in its entirety:
The copyright in a compilation or derivative work extends only to the material
contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting
material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
preexisting material. The copyright in such work is independent of, and does not

affect or enlarge the scope, duration, ownership, or subsistence of, any copyright
protection in the preexisting material.
Id. See also Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168.
30. Tasini, 206 F.3d at 168.
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Similarly, in Ryan v. CarlCorp.,31 the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California also construed the meaning of§ 20 1(c) narrowly, with a
strong focus on the congressional intent in creating that section.32 The Ryan
plaintiffs brought suit for copyright infringement against the defendant, whose
private company held the role as an interlibrary loan service center.33 The
function of defendant's company allowed customers to call and request an

article from the service center, which would then copy the requested article
from the periodical and send it to the customer.34 Usually, defendant would
send a copyright payment to the publisher or to a copyright payment
clearinghouse.35
Plaintiffs asserted that under §201(c) the defendant was prohibited from
reproducing the articles, without reproduction of the periodical in its entirety.36
Alternatively, defendant asserted that § 201(c) meant that publishers could
reproduce the contributed work even though the entire collective work was not
reproduced at the same time they reproduced the contribution." In rejecting
defendant's interpretation of § 201(c), the Ryan court relied on the historical
underpinnings of § 201 (c). 3" Namely, the Ryan court concluded that the main
reason to construe § 201(c) narrowly, and in favor of authorial rights, was
because of the harsh treatment authors received in the pre-1976 Copyright Act
era.39 The Ryan court emphasized that Congress promulgated §201 (c) mainly
in response to the copyright indivisibility doctrine, which forced authors of
contributions to collective works to either forego their rights to the publishers
of the collective work or allow the contributed work to fall in the public
domain.4" Thus, in the context of § 201 (c), and the struggle for rights between.

31. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, i 150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 1147.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id.
Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1149.
Id.
Id. at 1149-51. The Ryan court suggested that its interpretation of § 201(c) would read

as follows:

The privilege of reproducing the contribution "as part of that particular collected
work" plainly permits a publisher to include the contribution "in" the collected
work; otherwise, collected works would beimpossible. Likewise, there can be no
dispute that contributions may be reproduced "in" revised collected works and
"in" later collected works in the same series.
Id. at 1149-50.
39. Id. at 1150.
40. Id.
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publishers and authors, courts should construe §201(c) to enlarge the rights of
authors, as Congress intended. 4
The instant court, in applying § 201(c), relied heavily on the historical
foundation of the copyright clause found in both the U.S. Constitution and in the
House Reports.42 The instant court construed the language of § 201(c) very
narrowly when the instant court found that the rights granted to a contributor
of a collective work were greater than the privileges granted to the owner of the
copyright in the collective work.43 In doing so, the instant
44 court restricted the
publishers' use of a contribution to limited situations.
In the instant case, the CD-ROM compilation consisted of three separate
contributions: (1) the digitally reproduced old magazine issues; (2) the opening
montage; and (3) the computer program used to run the CD-ROMs. 41 The
instant court stated that a simple change of medium, such as the digital
reproduction of the old magazine issues, might have given appellee's protection
under §201(c) because a change of medium does not necessarily constitute a
new collective work.46 However, in the instant case, the instant court found that
the change in medium, together with the opening montage and the computer

41. Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
42. Greenberg v. Nat'l Geographic Soc'y, 244 F.3d 1267, 1271-72(11 th Cir. 2001); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476.
43. Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272.
44. Id. at 1273.

45. Id. at 1269.
46. Id. at 1274 n. 14. Specifically the instant court stated, "the mere electronic digital
reproduction that represents the Replica may not qualify as a derivative work, and thus not violate
Greenberg's exclusive right to prepare derivative works under § 106." Id. The instant court also
stated with regard to the instant case, "[b]ut here, as explained above, we have far more than a
mere reproduction in another medium." Id. Section 106 states:
Subject to Sections 107 through 120, the owner of copyright under this title has the
exclusive rights to do and to authorize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phono records;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies of phono records of the copyrighted work to the public by sale
or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes,
and motion pictures and other audiovisual work, to perform the copyrighted work
publicly;
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic work, pantomimes, and
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means
of a digital audio transmission.

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2001).
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program, amounted to a new collective work. The instant court further
explained that a reprint of a contribution from a prior issue to a later issue was
permissible under § 201 (c).4 8 Additionally, another permissible use would be
a revision of an entire collective work in which the contribution itself was not
revised.49 The § 201(c) privilege exists mainly to serve the purpose of a later
edition revision, not to allow a new collective work to be created based on prior
contributed works.° Thus, the instant court rationalized that to rule otherwise
and allow publishers greater use of contributed works would eradicate the
general rule."'
By relying on both congressional intent and the historical foundations ofthe
Copyright Act, the instant court, like the Ryan court, focused on the notion that
the Copyright Act was designed to protect an author's copyright.5 2 The instant
court further articulated that this goal would be thwarted if a publisher were
permitted to reprint and distribute the contributed work either by itself or as a
part of a new collection." Clearly, Congress intended to give the author the
freedom to contribute to a specified, patirular collective work without
subjecting the author to any and all uses of the contributed work.' Essentially,
the limitations articulate the notion that just because the author permitted the
publisher to use the contribution in one collective work does not mean that the
publisher has the permission to use the contributed work in whatever else the
publisher may desire to create.35
The instant court's decision preserves the fundamental goal of copyright law
by favoring a narrow focus on authorial rights. 6 Although the original
photograph could have been reproduced or revised properly under §201 (c) had
appellee only changed the medium, the instant court found that the addition of
the opening montage and the computer program resulted in appellee creating
a new collective work."' Section 201(c), designed to enlarge authorial rights,
does not permit a publisher to use a contribution in a new collective work. 8

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2001); Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272-73.
Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273.
Id.
See id. at 1272.
Id.; see also Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272-73.
See id.
See id. at 1273; see also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122-23.
See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1272.
See id. at 1274 n.14.
See id. at 1272.
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Therefore, appellee's use of appellant's photograph constituted a use of
appellant's contribution in a new collective work."'
The instant court found the language of§ 201 (c) ample enough to allow for
a limited use of revisions when the publisher reprints the entire collective work
as a new edition, but not in circumstances where the publisher revises the
contributed work itself.' Additionally, the House Reports of the Copyright Act
of 1976 reported that Congress intended for courts to interpret §201 (c) to favor
authors." ' The instant court also stated that its interpretation of§ 201 (c) was in
conformity, not only with legislative intent, but also with the intent of the
founding fathers of the U.S. Constitution.62 Since appellee's use of the
contribution was outside the intended privileges for a collective work, the use
of the photo infringed appellant's copyright. 3
The instant court's ruling allowed a narrow reading for when a publisher
may use a contributed work before infringing on an author's copyright, since
§ 201(c) does not explicitly bar the publisher's revision of a contribution."6
Though § 20 1(c) was implemented in conjunction with the Copyright Act of
1976, few court cases have had the opportunity to interpret the reach of the
section. 5 Congress, however, envisioned the scenario in which a publisher
wants to revise or reprint a collective work for a new edition and tries to
balance that interest with the author's interest in retaining a copyright on the
contributed work. Moreover, as society makes new technological advances
resulting in a greater demand for traditional aspects of society to advance to that
same level of technology, the courts will encounter more of a struggle between
authors and publishers.
Use of the House Reports allowed the instant court to correctly interpret the
legislative intent during §201 (c)'s formulation." The instant court's ruling is
a continuance of the public policy to support an author's right to contribute to
a collection without losing all rights to the contributed work. Moreover, the
limited privileges that § 201(c) gives to publishers provide an important
incentive for authors to keep creating and contributing without the risk of losing
their rights.

59. See id.
60. Id at 1273. Specifically, the House Report stated that, "Under the language of this
clause a publishing company could reprint a contribution from one issue in a later issue of its
magazine, and could reprint an article from a 1980 edition of an encyclopedia in a 1990 revision
of it." H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 122.
61. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476.
62. See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1271.
63. See id.at 1275.
64. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (2001).
65. See Ryan v. Carl Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1150 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
66. See Greenberg, 244 F.3d at 1273; see also Ryan, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
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